Commentary on "Urban colossus: why is New York America's largest city?"

This article is commentary on a paper presented at a conference organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in April 2005, "Urban Dynamics in New York City." The goal of the conference was threefold: to examine the historical transformations of the engine-of-growth industries in New York and distill the main determinants of the city's historical dominance as well as the challenges to its continued success; to study the nature and evolution of immigration flows into New York; and to analyze recent trends in a range of socioeconomic outcomes, both for the general population and recent immigrants more specifically.Economic conditions - New York (N.Y.) ; Federal Reserve District, 2nd ; Urban economics

"Sick of Local Government Corruption? Vote Islamic"

Indonesia has a tradition of corruption among local officials who harass and collect bribes from firms. Corruption flourished in the Suharto, pre-democracy era. This paper asks whether local democratization that occurred after Suharto reduced corruption and whether specific local politics, over and above the effects of local culture, affect corruption. We have a firm level data set for 2001 that benchmarks bribing activity and harassment at the time when Indonesia decentralized key responsibilities to local democratically elected governments. We have a second data set for 2004 on corruption at the end of the first democratic election cycle. We find that, overall, corruption declines between these time periods. But specific politics matter. Islamic parties in Indonesia are perceived as being anti-corruption. Our data show voting patterns reflect this belief and voters' perceptions have some degree of accuracy. In the first democratic election, localities that voted in legislatures dominated by secular parties, including Megawati's party, experienced significant relative increases in corruption, while the reverse was the case for those voting in Islamic parties. But in the second election in 2004, in those localities where corruption had increased under secular party rule, voters "threw the bums out of office" and voted in Islamic parties.

Where do manufacturing firms locate their headquarters?

Firms’ headquarters [HQ] support their production activity, by gathering information and outsourcing business services, as well as, managing, evaluating, and coordinating internal firm activities. In search of a better location for these functions, firms often separate the HQ function physically from their production facilities and construct stand-alone HQs. By locating its HQ in a large, service oriented metro area away from its production facilities, a firm may be better able to out-source service functions in that local metro market and also to gather information about market conditions for their products. However if the firm locates the HQ away from its production activity, that increases the coordination costs in managing plant activities. In this paper we empirically analyze the trade-off of these two considerations.Corporations - Headquarters ; Industrial location ; Manufactures

Corruption in Indonesia

Bribes by firms in Indonesia arise principally from regulations --licenses and levies --imposed by local government officials. Regulations generate direct revenues (fees) plus indirect revenues in the form of bribes. The expected value of the latter is capitalized into lower salaries needed by localities to compensate public officials. Localities in Indonesia are hampered by insufficient revenues from formal tax and transfer sources to pay competitive salaries plus fund demanded' levels of public services, because local tax rates are capped by the center and inter-governmental transfers are limited. Thus the direct and indirect revenues from local regulations are critical to local finances. The paper models and estimates the key aspects of corruption -- the relationship between bribes, time spent with local officials, and different forms of regulation. It models how inter-jurisdictional competition for firms limits the extent of local regulation and how greater sources of tax or inter-governmental revenues reduce the need for regulation and corruption. The paper estimates a large reduction in regulation in better funded localities. The findings are directly relevant to Indonesia where corruption is high and the country is in the throes of major decentralization and local democratization efforts.

Geography and development

The most striking fact about the economic geography of the world is the uneven spatial distribution of economic activity, including the coexistence of economic development and underdevelopment. High-income regions are almost entirely concentrated in a few temperate zones, half of the world's GDP is produced by 15 percent of the world's population, and 54 percent of the world's GDP is produced by countries occupying just 10 percent of the world's land area. The poorest half of the world's population produces only 14 percent of the world's GDP, and 17 of the poorest 20 nations are in tropical Africa. The unevenness is also manifest within countries and within metropolitan concentrations of activity. Why are these spatial differences in land rents and wages not bid away by firms and individuals in search of low-cost or high-income locations? Why does economic activity cluster in centers of activity? And what are the consequences of remoteness from existing centers? The authors argue that understanding these issues is central for understanding many aspects of economic development and underdevelopment at the international, national, and subcontinental levels. They review the theoretical and empirical work that illuminates how the spatial relationship between economic units changes and conclude that geography matters for development, but that economic growth is not governed by a geographic determinism. New economic centers can develop, and the costs of remoteness can be reduced. Many explicit policy instruments have been used to influence location decisions. But none has been systematically successful, and many have been very costly-in part because they were based on inappropriate expectations. Moreover, many ostensibly nonspatial policies that benefit specific sectors and households have spatial consequences since the targeted sectors and households are not distributed uniformly across space. These nonspatial policies can sometimes dominate explicitly spatial policies. Further work is needed to better understand these dynamics in developing countries.Economic Theory&Research,Decentralization,Labor Policies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Banks&Banking Reform,Municipal Financial Management,Health Economics&Finance,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies

Aid, social capital and village public goods: after the tsunami.

Using survey data on fishermen and fishing villages in Aceh, Indonesia from 2005 and 2007, this paper examines the effect of the December 2004 tsunami and resulting massive aid effort on local public good provision, in particular on public labor inputs, but also public capital choices. Also analyzed are the roles of and changes in local social and political institutions and participation in political and social activities. Such an examination informs not only our understanding of the impacts of aid on villages, but also our understanding of how villages allocate resources to public goods. For public labor inputs, volunteerism is lower in villages with more aid projects, but that is offset if the dominant donor mitigates agency problems by doing its own implementation. Volunteerism is lower in villages with more 'democratic' activity such as elections, although that effect is mitigated in villages with higher levels of social capital pre-tsunami. Evidence suggests volunteerism is lower not because of changes in types of leaders with village elections per se, but rather due to heightened internal divisions associated with elections. Correspondingly for public capital, villages with more democratic activity combined with more aid projects tend to emphasize garnering private aid (e.g., houses) at the expense of public aid (e.g., public buildings).Aid, Volunteer, Public Goods.

Externalities and Industrial Development

Using a panel data set of county-level employment in machinery, electrical machinery, primary metals, transportation, and instruments, this paper analyzes the role of dynamic externalities for individual industries. Key issues examined include the role of externalities from own industry concentration (localization, or MAR externalities) versus the role of externalities from overall diversity of the local environment (urbanization, or Jacobs externalities). In contrast to previous studies, use of panel data allows us to separate these effects out from fixed/random effects influencing industries over time. Panel data also allow us to estimate a lag structure to externality variables, indicating how long history matters and the time pattern of effects. A particular issue concerns whether conditions from the immediate year or so prior to the current have the biggest impact on current employment, or periods several years prior have the largest impact. For all industries both localization and urbanization effects are important. For traditional industries most effects die out after four or five years, but for high tech industries effects can persist longer. The biggest effects are typically from conditions of three to four years ago, in the county and metropolitan area.

The Effects of Urban Concentration on Economic Growth

The paper examines whether there is a significant relationship between economic growth and the degree of urban concentration, as measured by primacy, or the share of the largest metro area in national urban population. Is there reason to believe many countries have excessive primacy and how costly is excessive (or insufficient) primacy? Using GMM methods, the paper estimates growth effects, using a panel of 80-100 countries from 1960 to 1995. It also looks at the determinants of primacy and policy instruments that might be effective in reducing excessive primacy. The paper finds that there is a best degree of national urban primacy, which increases sharply up to a per capita income of about $5000 (PPP 1987 income), before declining modestly. The best degree of primacy declines with country scale. Error bands about estimated best degrees of primacy are generally tight. Growth losses from significantly non-optimal concentration are large and rise with income. Results are very robust. In a group of 72 countries in 1990, it appears that at least 24 have satisfactory primacy; at least 24 have significantly excessive primacy; and at least 5 countries have too little. What determines urban concentration? Econometric models show that urban concentration initially rises with income and then peaks around an income of$2400, before declining. Openness, or trade effects are modest. Similarly, the effects of a greater degree of political decentralization while significantly reducing urban concentration are quite modest. The key policy type variable affecting concentration is investment in inter-regional transport infrastructure. In particular, increases in the density of road networks significantly reduce primacy, with the effect rising with income. As a policy consideration, this takes heightened importance because growth losses from excessive primacy tend to rise with income. The effect on growth rates of investment in roads, through its effect on primacy, is highest in middle income countries.

Urban land markets and city development: Sub-Saharan Africa

Rapidly growing cities in sub-Saharan Africa face immense population pressures. Weak institutions and outdated regulations inherited from the colonial era threaten to stifle their progress. This paper examines the institutions underlying the operation of urban land markets in Sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on property rights, the evolution of cities and their spatial layout, planning, and property taxes. Countries typically have a dual system of property rights, with in theory formal rights in cities, communal tenure in rural areas, and a transition between the two systems at growing city boundaries. However, large portions of cities operate outside these systems under informal rights. Using case studies and within city variation, we review the historical evolution of these systems in a number of African cities. We argue that cities lacking formal property rights tend to build lower and less intensively, often with slums persisting near the city center, where there is much higher value alternative use. We further explore the relationship between lack of owner occupancy and wealth inequality, as partially affected by the transition to private property rights. Next, we discuss the critical role of planning. Francophone countries for instance historically imposed comprehensive planning on urban land markets compared to Anglophone counterparts. This resulted in greater contiguity and density of land use, gridded urban layouts, and less leapfrogging in new developments. Where planning is weak, special initiatives such as sites and services may impose planning on certain greenfield neighbourhoods, with benefits accruing in the future. The paper then examines problems in property tax enforcement and collection, discussing reforms to improve collections. The paper concludes with a discussion of policy considerations and a research agenda